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ABSTRACT
In this paper we present a strategy-adjustment process for
finding a Nash equilibrium in a noncooperative N-person game.
The adjustment consists of increasing the probabilities with
which profitable strategies are played, while probabilities
belonging to the unprofitable strategies are decreased. These
increases and decreases are relative to the initial probabi-
lities. This memorizing of the starting point is such that it
prevents the process from both cycling andleaving the stra-
tegy space. Besides, the process converges under very weak
conditions and can be followed discretely by a so-called sim-
plicial algorithm. Finally, the process is compared with
other adjustment processes on the strategy space.
1. Introduction
Recently,van der Laan and Talman (4) developed several ad-
justment processes for sclving the nonlinear complementarity
problem (NLCP) on the n-dimensional unit simplex. This pro-
blem concerns the search for a vector x~ in Sn - {x E~t}}ll
nfl
E xi - 1} for which z(x~) ~ 0, where z is a continuous func-
i-1
tion from Sn to7Rn}1 satisfying xTZ(x) - 0 for all x in Sn.
The processes mentioned can start anywhere and converge to a
solution when z is continuously differentiable. Besides, the
processes can be followed discretely and arbitrary close by
so-called simplicial algorithms. The latter feature provides
the possibility of calculating a solution vector.Unu uf t.hu m~iin appl~cat~on~ of thc~ NLC1' on Sn is tl~c~ r,rc~hl~rr~
c,f f~nc3rny an c~yuilivriun~ F~rice vector ir~ a pure er.char,ye
economy. In that case Sn is regarded as t}ie price space of
the economy and the adjustment process can be interpreted as
a l~rice-adjustment process. In this way we can compare the
adjustment processes on Sn of van der Laan and Talman with
other price-adjustment processes like the Walras tatonne-
ment process and the quasi-Newton processes of Smale (5).
The Walras process only converges under very strong condi-
tions, such as revealed preferences or gross-substitutability,
while the Smale processes only converge locally. Besides, it
is difficult to follow these processes discretely. All this
Sives reason to prefer the processes described in (4). This
the more because the latter processes also posses an attrac-
tive economic interpretation. One of these processes gene-
rates a path of prices by decreasing initially the prices
corresponding to goods with excess supply while those of the
goods with excess demand are increased. Contrary to the Wal-
ras tatonnement process both the increases and decreases
are relative to the initial price vector. This memorizing of
the starting vector during the process prevents the process
from both cycling and leaving the price simplex. The other
processes in (4) only adapt the prices of the goods with a
maximal excess supply or demand. Again the memorizing of the
initial price vector guarantees convergency.
The generalization of these processes in order to solve the
NLCP on the product space S of N unit simplices has been gi-
ven by van den Elzen, van der Laan and Talman in (2). Let
S- N Sn~,so that x in S is equal to x-(xi,...,xN)T with
j-1
n
x. E S ~, j E IN -{1,2,...,N}. In the NLCP on S we search
J
for a vector x~ in S for which z( x~) ~ 0, where z: S-~
7E2NfM,
N -
M- ~. nj, is a continuous function satisfying x~zj(x) - 0
j-1
for all x E S and j E IN. In (2) three processes were intro-
duced, the sum-, the product- and the exponent-process. Thelatter process can be considered as the generalization of
the Walrasian type adjustment process in (9) while the sum-
and the product-process are based on the other two processes
on Sn. f~'urthermore, these processes on S posses the same nice
properties as their counterparts on Sn.
Problems which can be transformed into an NLCP on S are the
problem of finding a Nash equilibrium in a noncooperative
game and the search for an equili-brium price vector in an in-
ternational trade model with international.ly traded common
goods and domestic goods traded only in one country. The
first problem can be four.d in (1) and the second one in (3).
When applied to a noncooperative game the processes become
strategy-adjustment processes while in case of an economy we
can interprete them as price-adjustment processes. The main
subject of this paper concerns the interpretation of the ex-
ponent-process as a strategy-adjustment process. This inter-
pretation is given in section 4. In that section we also com-
pare the exponent-process with the sum- and the product-pro-
cess when these processes are applied to a noncooperative
game. Section 2 deals with the transformation of the problem
of finding a Nash equilibríum in a noncooperative N-nerson
game into an NLCP on S. A mathematical treatment of the ex-
ponent-process for solving the general NLCP on S is given in
section 3.
2. The noncooperative N-person game in NLCP-form
In this section we transform the problem of finding a Nash
equilibrium strategy vector in a noncooperative game into an
NLCP on S. We follow the description as given in (1). The
noncooperative N-person game consists of N players indexed
wíth j, j E IN, where player j possesses njtl pure strategies
denoted by (j,k), k- 1,...,n.fl. In the sequel the set of
J
pure strategies of player j ís denoted by I(j), i.e. I(j) -
N
i(j,l), (j,2),...,(j,njfl)} while I- u I(j) is the set of
j-14
all pure strategies in the game. The pure strategy vector
1 N
k - ((l,kl) , (2,k1) , . . . , (N,k,~) ) E ;~ I (j ) denotes that player
j-1
j plays his kj-th pure strategy. The set J is the collection
of all pure strategy vectors. Further, for each j E IN t'r~ere
is a loss-function a-' : J-~ Itt, where a~ (k) is the loss to
player j if the pure strategy vector k E J is played. A vec-
N n -
tor x-(xi,...,xN)T in S- II S ~ is the mixed strategy
j-1
vector indicating that player j plays his h-th strategy with
probability xjh, (j,h) E I(j) and j E IN. We call S the stra-
te s ace of the ame. Notice that
r.~tl
9Y P g E xjh - I aná xjh ~ 0
h-1
for all h E{1,...,njtl} so that xj is indeed a probability
vector for all j E IN. Furthermore, each pure strategy vec-
tor coincides with a vertex of S.
The expected loss to player j when strategy vector x in S is
played is equal to
N
p~ (x) - ~ a~ (k) ;t x.
kEJ - i-1 ~1
We call a strategy vector a Nash equilibrium if no player has
incentives to change his strategy. Therefore we consider
mh(x), being the marginal loss to player j if he plays his
h-th pure strategy while the other players do not chanc~e
their strategy xi, i~ j, i.e.




In these terms a mixed strategy vector x~ in S is a Nash
equilibrium if p~(x~)- rah(x~) ~ 0 for all (j,h) E Z. When the
latter holds no change in a strategy of a player causes a de-
crease in his expected loss. With respect to the NLCP on S it
is natural to take as the function z the continuous function
from S to RN}M defined by zjh(x) - p~(x)-nh(x), (j,h) E I.
In the sequel we often refer to this function as the excess-
profit-function. Note that when zjh(x) ~ 0 it is profitable5
for player j to play his h-th pure strategy. Therefore we
call a strategy (j,h) in I profitable to player j when stra-
tegy vector x in S is valid if zjh(x) ~ O,and unprofitable
to player j if zjh(x) ~ 0. Further, a strategy (j,h) in I is
saíd to be in equilibrium at vector x when zjh(x) - 0,
while a player j, j E IN, is defined to be in equilibrium at
x if zj (x) ~ 0. njtl
Because p~(x) - E xjh mh(x), we can derive that x~zj(x) - 0
h-1
for all j E IN and x E S. So, the problem of finding a Nash
equilíbrium in a noncooperative N-person game has been trans-
formed into a problem of searching for a vector x~ in S for
which z(x~) ~ 0, where z is a continuous function from S to
~NtM satisfying x~zj(x) - 0, x E S and j E IN. Note that the
excess-profit-function is multi-linear and therefore continu-
ously differentiable, which will guarantee the convergence of
the sum-, product- and exponent-process.
3. Mathematical exposure of the exponent-process on S
Here we present the exponent-process for solving the general
NLCP on S. For a thorough treatment we refer the reader to
(2) .
The process is completely governed by the sign pattern of the
function values and the location in S of the starting point.
In fact the process generates vectors x in S such that for




bvjk ~ xjk ~ (lfaj)~jk
if vjk ~ 0 and zjk(x; ~ 0
O ~ hj~` ~. ~j
if vjk - 0 and zjk(x) ~ 0
if zjk (x) ~ 0
if vjk ~ 0 and zjk (x) - 0
if vjk - 0 and zjk(x) - 0,6
where v-(vi, v2,...,vN)T is the arbitrarily chosen starting
vector in S.
To describe the process in more detail, let the vector s-
(si, s2,...,sN)T be a sign vector in RN}r1, i.e. s.k E
J
{-1,O,t1} for all {j,k) E I. For each siqn vector s in y~NtM
we define for j- 1,2,...,N,
Ij(s) - {(7.k) E I(j)~sjk - -1}
I~ (s) - { (j,k) E I (j) ; sjk - 0}
and
I~ (s) - { (j .k) E I (j) ~ sjk - fl} ,
I- (s) - j I~ (s) , Io (s) - j I~ (s) and I} (s) - j I~ (s),
where the union is over all j E IN. Furthermore we denote for
al l j E IN ,
Vj -{(j~k) E I(j)~~jk - 0} and V~ - I(j)~Vj.
For each sign vector s we define the set A(s) by
A(s) -{x E Sjx. -(lf?,.)v. if s. - tl and v. ~ 0
~k ~ ~k ~k ~k
xjk - aj if sjk - tl and vjk - 0
xjk - bvjk if sjk - -1
bvjk ~ xjk ~(ltaj)vjr if sjk - 0 and vjk ~ 0
p ~ xjk ~ aj if sjk - 0 and vjk - 0
with 0 ~ b ~ 1 and a~ ~ 0 for all j E IN}.
Note that the sets A(s) are related to the position of x in S
with res~ect to the starting vector. Related to the sign pat-7
tern of ti;e function values we define for each sign vector s
the region C(s) by
C(s) - CA{x E S;sgn z(x) - s},
where Ck(W) denotes the closure of the set W. The exoonent-
process now generates for varyíng s,vectors x in S lying in
both A(s) and C(s). In (2) it is proved that only intersec-
tions related to sign vectors in the set -r3 are relevant,
where
T3 -{s E 7RN}M'i ,~j E IN, either I~ (s) - p or
Ij(s) ~ V~ ~ p, and ~j E IN with I~(s) ~ m}.
For s E z3, each nonempty B(s) - A(s) n C(s) consists, under
some regularity conditions, of a disjoint union of smooth
loops and paths with two endpoints. Each endpoint of a path
in 13(s) is either an endpoint of a path in B(sl} for some
sl E T3, or a solution point of the NLCP, or is equal to the
initial point v. The point v is only an endpoint of a path
in B(s~), where s~ - sgn z(v). Notice that if an endpoint of
a path in B(s) lies in C(s') with s' ~ T3 this point is a
solution to the NLCP. The set B- ~ B(s) therefore consists,
sET3
under some regularity conditions and if z is continuously
differentiable, of a disjoint union of piecewise smooth paths
and loops. One path in B connects v with a solution x~, The
latter path is generateà by the exponent-process. The other
paths in B connect two solution points.
4. The interpretation of the exponent-process in strategic
terms.
To become more famíliar with the matter we start this section
with an example concerning a noncooperative game with two









Figure 1. The areas C((fl,-l,tl,-1)T), C((tl,-l,-l,tl)T),
C( (-l,tl,tl,-1) T) and C( (-l,fl,-l,fl) T) are denoted by I, II,
III and IV, respectively. The path generated by the exponent-
process is heavily drawn.
The process starts from the strategy vector v, where the se-
cond strategy of each player is profitable while their respec-
tive first strategies are unprofitable. The process then en-
ters A((-l,fl,-l,fl)T) by increasing proportionally the pro-
babilities of the profitable strategies of each player and
by decreasing proportionally all the probabilities belonging
to the unprofitable ones till a strategy vector for which
player 2 isin equilibrium is generated. The process now pro-
ceeds in A((-1,t1,0,0)T) by increasing the probabilíty of the
first strategy of player 2 relatively away from the probabili-
ty of player one's first strategy while keeping player 2 in
equilibrium. Then the process reaches A((-l,fl,fl,-1)T)
where the probability of the second strategy of player 2 be-
comes, relatively to the initial probability vector, ec;ual to
the probability belonging to the first strategy of player 1.













B((-l,tl,fl,-1)7) by making the second strategy of player 2
unprofitable and his first one profitable. In B((-l,fl,fl,-1)~)
the process reaches a vector at which player 1 is in equili-
brium. Via a curve in B((O,O,fl,-1)T) the Nash equilibrium x~
is reached.
An important feature of the exponent-process is that probabi-
lities belonging to profitable strategies are initially in-
creased while those of unprofitable strategies are decreased.
When initially strategy (j,h) is profitable, the expected
loss to player j if he plays strategy h is less than the ex-
pected loss when playing his strategy vector vj. So, his ex-
pected profit will increase when xjh becomes larger. Similar
arguments can be given for the treatment of initially unpro-
fitable strategies.
Now we present the ir.terpretation of the exponent-process
when applied to a noncooperative N-person game. From the ar-
bitrarily chosen initial strategy vector v, the exponent-pro-
cess decreases proportionally the probabilities of all the
unprofitable strategies of the game with the same rate and
increases for each player the probabilities belonging to the
profitable strategies. For each player the amount of increase
of a probability belonging to a profitable strategy initially
not used is equal to the rate with which the probabilities of
all his profitable strategies having positive initial proba-
bility are increased.
In general, the exponent-process generates strategy vectors
x for which the probabilities of the unprofitable strategies
in the game are relatively (to v) equal to each other but re-
latively smaller than the probabílities of all the other
strategies. Moreover, for each player the probabilities of
his initially not used profitable strategies are kept positive
and equal to each other and equal to the rate with which the
probabilities belonging to his other profitable strategies
are equally increased. Finally, the probabilities corres,:ond-10
in~~ to thc profitable strategies of a;~layer are alw.ays kelt
rclatively (absolutely) larc~er thar, those of all his other
strate;ies. In rrinciple the strateyy of a nlayer which be--
comes in equilibrium, i.e. for which th~ excess nrofit be--
comes equal to zero, is kept in ecruilibrium.
If this strategy was unprofitable its nrobability is relatí-
vely increased away from the probabilities of the unprofit-
able strategies in the game wtlile if this strategy was pro-
fitable its ~~robability is relatively decreased away from
the probabilities belonging to his profitable strategies. It
might happen that a player becomes in equilibrium so that he
does not have any profitable strategy left. In this case the
probabilities of his (nonprofitable) strategies are changed
in order to keep him in equilibrium.
If for a player the probability of a strategy in equilibrium
becomes relatively equal to the probabilities of the unpro-
fitable strategies in the game, then the first probability is
kept relatively equal to the latter ones and the correspond-
ing strategy is made unprofitable. In this way a player might
get out of equilibrium in which case also the strategy with
the relative (absolute) largest probability is made profit-
able. Although it seems somewhat peculíar to disturb the equi-
lihrium position of a player he can now only be kept in equi-
librium by decreasing the probability of one of his strategies
in equilibrium under the level of the unprofitable strategies
in the game. But then cycling or leaving the strategy space
might occur. Finally, if for a player the probability of a
strategy in equilibrium becomes relatívely equal to the proT
babilities of his profitable strategies (if any), then the
first probability is kept relatively equal to the latter ones
and the corresponding strategy is made profitable. The pro-
cess stops when all players are in equilibrium, i.e. when no
player has a profitable strategy anymore.
To conclude we want to make a short comparison between the
interpretation of the sum-, product- and exponent-process as11
adjustment processes when applied to the problem of finding a
Nash ec3uilibrium in a noncooperative N-person game. The sum-
process follows a path of strategy vectors x such that for
all j E IN, x.k ~ b v.k if z.k(x) - max zih(x) and x.k -
J J 7 J (i,h)EI J
b.v.k if z.k(x) ~ max zih(x), where 0 ~ b. ~ 1. Also here,
J J J (i,h)~I - J -
this memorizing of the starting vector guarantees convergency.
When we observe the sum-process more precisely we see that it
increases initially the probability of the most profitable
strategy in the game while the probabilities corresponding to
the other strategies of that player are decreased all with the
same rate. The strategy vectors of the other players are not
changed. In general the sum-process follows a path of stra-
tegy vectors such that for each player the probabilities of
his strategies not having maximal excess profit in the game
are kept relatively equal to each other and relatively small-
er than the probabilities belonging to the most profitable
strategies of the game handled by that player. If a strategy
of a player becomes one of the most profitable in the game,
the corresponding probability is relatively increased while
keeping this strategy most profitable. When for a player the
probability of a most profitable strategy becomes relatively
equal to the probabilities of his strategies not having maxi-
mal excess profit, the first probability is kept relatively
equal to the latter probabilities and its excess profit is
decreased away from the maximal excess profit. The sum-pro-
cess stops when the maximal excess profit in the game is zero.
The path of the product--process follows strategy vectors x
for which for all j E IN,x.k ~ bv.k if z.k(x) - max z.h(x)
J J J (J rh)EI (J) J
and xjk - bvjk if zjk(x) ~ max zjh(x) where 0 ~ b ~ 1.
(J,h)EI(J) ~
So, the product-process initially increases the probabilities
belonging to the most profitable strategies of each player,
whereas the probabilities of all the other strategies in the
cJame are decreasecï wíth the same rate. In general the product-12
process follows a path of strategy vectors such that all the
probabilities of the strategies, not having maximal excess
profit for a Flayer,are relatively enual to each other aná
re.atively smaller than those belon,in5 to one's most profit--
able strategies. If a strategy of a certain player becomes
one of his most profitable strategies, the probability of
this strategy is relatively increased while keeping this
strategy most profitable for him. When for a player the pro-
bability of one of his most profitable strategies becomes re-
latively equal to the probabilities belonging to his less
profitable strategies, the first probability is kept relative-
ly equal to the latter ones and its excess profit is decreas-
ed away from the excess profit of his most profitable stra-
tegies.
When overlooking the foregoing we see that the sum-process
focusses its attention only to the most profitable strategies
in the game. The corresponding probabilities are relatively
increased while all the others are decreased. By successive
extensions of the set of most profitable strategies in the
game a solution with a maximal excess profit equal to zero is
reached. Observe that during this process the probabilitíes
corresponding to profitable (but not the most profitable)
strategies might decrease. This intuitively seems to be un-
realistic. The product-process considers only the most profit-
able strategies of each separate player. This yields a simi-
lar unrealistic interpretation as for the sum-process. The
exponent-process however takes all the strategies into account.
Probabilities belonging to profitable strategies are relative-
ly increased while those corresponding to unprofitable stra-
tegies are relatively decreased. The exponent-process sear-
ches for an equilibrium by adapting all the probabilitie~ at
once and in a direct manner, i.e. till a strategy has become
in equilibrium. The sum- and product-process however generate
a path by only considering part of the strategies. The Nash
equilibrium is reached in an indirect manner, i.e. when the13
set of mc~:.t j~rofitable strateyies is such tiiat the corres~-~on-
ding uxcess-profit is zero. Beside:s, the exponent-process
possesscs the most appealing stratecicinterpretation. ~Jhy
should only the probabilities of the most profitable strate-
gy Le increased and not those of other profitable strategies?
All this makes the exponent-process to the thecretically most
interesting strategy-adjustment process. Moreover, we may ex-
pect that the exponent-process converges auicker than the
other processes. A simplicial algorithm to approximately fol-
low the path of points generated by the process will be des-
cribed in a subsequent paper.
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